

BUILDING A JOINT SECURITY COOPERATION LOGISTICS CAPABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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AFGHANISTAN**

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ABSTRACT

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The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a well-developed security cooperation program to conduct Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. They require and expect highly trained logistics personnel and a functional logistics system to deliver the logistics capabilities to execute their security cooperation operations. The reality is that JFCs often receive logisticians with limited or no training in security cooperation and struggle with a dysfunctional supply system that rarely meets regulatory and operational standards. The joint community's inability to provide qualified joint logisticians and modular structures to execute supply operations in support of security cooperation programs in deployed locations is a capability gap requiring resolution. The intent of this paper is to examine the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) security cooperation operations in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in conjunction with policy and joint doctrine in order to highlight lessons learned in developing a joint logistics team and functional logistics system. The goal is to identify supply operations capabilities the

future JFC will require to execute successful, efficient security cooperation operations in a contingency environment.

BUILDING A JOINT SECURITY COOPERATION LOGISTICS CAPABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Joint logistics capabilities enable the achievement of objectives (ends) through combinations of functions (ways) executed by people and processes (means) within a broad range of conditions and to a specified set of standards.¹

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a well-developed security cooperation program to conduct Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.² They require and expect highly trained logistics personnel and a functional logistics system to deliver the logistics capabilities to execute their security cooperation operations. The reality is that JFC's often receive logisticians with limited or no training in security cooperation and struggle with a dysfunctional supply system that rarely meets regulatory and operational standards. The joint community's inability to provide qualified joint logisticians and modular structures to execute supply operations in support of security cooperation programs in deployed locations is a capability gap requiring resolution.

The intent of this strategic research paper is to examine the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) security cooperation operations in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) between July 2006 and June 2007 in conjunction with policy and joint doctrine in order to highlight lessons learned in developing a joint logistics team and functional logistics system. The goal is to identify supply operations capabilities the future JFC will require to execute successful, efficient security cooperation operations in a contingency environment.

The Situation

The research strategy for this project was to provide information to the JFC whose strategic leadership would guide and focus a multinational effort to provide security cooperation to a developing nation. The leader's task would encompass all the elements of strategic art to include strategic leadership, strategic theorist, and strategic practitioner.³ Personal experience in Afghanistan and the observations of the command challenges in the execution of the program to train, equip, and mentor the ANSF provide a vivid reference of the immense difficulties of such an undertaking. Mission success at the strategic level is the establishment of a secure environment to facilitate the overall development of a nation. Mission failure at the strategic level would result in the squandering of billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars and a backwards leap in America's overall security objectives for a developing nation.⁴

The reader should attempt to visualize the reality of becoming strategic leader and assuming command of an organization charged with the daunting task of growing and developing a national security force that consists of 70,000 soldiers and 82,000 police officers. This equates to building a force from scratch that equals about one third of the active U.S. Army. It includes the development of the national ministries that provide the oversight and guidance throughout the nation. The task requires the establishment of the entire structure from the squad to corps in the Afghan National Army (ANA) and district to regional level in Afghan National Police (ANP). The mission itself is herculean but the underlying conditions of the task can further complicate the realization and speed of success.

The JFC executes the task on a compressed time schedule while fighting a multifaceted insurgency, while assisting a dysfunctional government striving for

legitimacy, and while located inside a country that has not known peace for over three decades.⁵ Under these conditions, the JFC directs a woefully undermanned pick up team of logisticians to execute the equipment and sustainment requirements for the Afghan security forces. The national equipping program, which is only one task in the mission, contains the planning, programming, budgeting, acquisition, receipt, storage, issue, and sustainment of everything from bootlaces to major end items. The complexity of the acquisition system will contain many of the processes in the DOD; however, the distribution of funds and the criticality of time quadruple the pace of execution. The inherent interface with DOD and service acquisition programs forces the in-country logistics team to wade daily into the prodigious DOD bureaucracy that operates at a far slower pace than the 24/7 deployed environment.⁶ The CONUS supporting agencies, government-auditing organizations and the international visibility of the mission requires that all process execution adhere to the highest standards and in accordance with appropriate laws, operating procedures and regulations.

The standard for execution of the task requires the JFC to have a team of multifunctional logisticians knowledgeable in applicable laws, regulations, and joint practices for security cooperation operations and joint logistics operations. It is highly likely that he will not have such a team due to the current method used to requisition joint personnel through individual augmentation. His command and the logistics team remains under constant scrutiny of the United States Congress, Government Accountability Office (GAO), DoD Inspector General (IG), the DOD Comptroller, the U.S. State Department, and the supported national government to ensure that they meet appropriate standards. Having visualized the task, conditions and standards the

next requirement is to review the strategic, joint, and legal framework that underpins all security cooperation operations and demands the development and deployment of a highly trained and competent logistics team in support of SSTR operations.

Strategic, Joint and Legal Relevance

It is important to highlight the strategic, joint and legal relevance of this topic. A quick review of relevant strategic publications, joint doctrine and law provides a solid framework to demonstrate the importance of providing a highly trained and competent logistics capability to the JFC. This framework is relevant not only to security cooperation operations in Afghanistan, but also to similar operations in Iraq and to in future joint operations. Understanding the strategic, joint, and legal relevance of the security cooperation mission in SSTR operations is essential to the JFC and the supporting joint logistics team.

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.⁷

The above quote demonstrates America's resolve to build a safer and more secure world through the advancement of democracy. Successful security cooperation programs are critical elements of the effort to advance young democracies and sustain existing ones. The development of the capability to provide more efficient security cooperation logistics teams to execute major missions overseas therefore becomes a joint requirement with a direct impact on U.S. National Security Strategy.

The National Military Strategy further highlights that stability operations create favorable conditions that allow other instruments of power to succeed.⁸ Logistics operations are a common capability in major combat operations and stability operations. Synchronization of the core joint logistics capabilities across the spectrum of operations allows the JFC to align regional objectives with national security objectives.

For example, the readiness of the ANA and the ANP has a major strategic impact on the United States and its coalition partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts to fight the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. Their development is essential to maintaining security in Afghanistan, preventing the return of the extremist movements and destroying the drug trade that finances major terrorist operations and the insurgency. The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) are very dependent on security cooperation in order to train, equip, and sustain their organizations. Simply stated the Afghans provide the people with the will to fight, and the United States Government's security cooperation program provides almost everything else.

In 2005, the Department of Defense published a new policy for military support to SSTR operations. DoDD 3000.05, *Military Support to SSTR Operations*, identifies stability operations as a core mission that military must prepare to support. It links stability operations to the National Security Strategy and identifies the potential sources for human resources to support the mission. In summary, it provides the policy framework for the development of military-civilian teams with the appropriate equipment and training to support security cooperation programs in SSTR operations.⁹

Military support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations is a current Joint Operating Concept (JOC). JOCs are operational descriptions that describe how the future JFC will provide military support to operations within a military campaign in pursuit of national strategic objectives. The current SSTR operations JOC articulates a military problem similar to the situation visualized above and attempts to drive the development of service/joint transformation in order to address the execution of SSTR operations.¹⁰ The JOC identifies joint force generation and management as an element of the functional capabilities required across the Joint Force, U.S. Government departments and agencies, and multinational organizations in order for the Joint Force to perform tasks that occur during SSTR operations.¹¹ The JOC recognizes that the DOD force structure and force management policies will not facilitate the recruitment, development, rotation, and sustainment of sufficient military personnel for extended duration and manpower intensive SSTR operations. It identifies this issue as a medium risk to SSTR operations. It recommends a mitigation strategy that involves the development and experimentation of innovative concepts that would enable the Joint Force to conduct SSTR operations without a dramatic increase in manpower, e.g., development of niche and surge capabilities within the Total Force, longer tours to maintain force structure, and on-the-ground expertise.¹²

Current joint and service doctrine contains practical wisdom to enforce the JFC's need to have appropriate forces and unique capabilities to conduct SSTR operations. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, identifies security cooperation planning and execution as one of the three subsets of joint strategic planning which contributes to national strategic planning.¹³ JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, states that the JFC may need to realign

forces and capabilities or adjust force structure to begin stability operations in some portions of the operational area even while sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas.¹⁴ The most recent publication of FM 3-0, *Operations*, identifies stability operations a key element in the Army operational concept of full spectrum operations.¹⁵ JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics Support*, which contains joint doctrine for logistics operations is currently under revision; however, security cooperation operations are highlighted as a major operational consideration for joint logisticians. It identifies seven core logistics capabilities – supply, maintenance, distribution and deployment, health services, operational engineering, logistics services, and operational contract support. It further identifies supporting functional capabilities for each core capability.¹⁶ Developing and deploying joint logistics teams to execute these tasks are critical to the successful execution of security cooperation operations. The core joint logistics capabilities form the framework for logistics force capability recommendations in this paper.

During execution, relevant law will set the parameters for all security cooperation programs during SSTR operations. Title 10 or 10 United States Code establishes the legal basis of U.S. forces engaging in security cooperation activities. Some DOD security cooperation operations also receive legal justification from Title 22.¹⁷ Security cooperation programs have their foundations in U.S. public laws that provide security assistance authorizations and appropriations. Certain security assistance programs require authorization and appropriation of funds by Congress. Four such programs include the international military education and training (IMET) program, the foreign military financing program (FMFP), the economic support fund (ESF), and peacekeeping operations (PKO). Foreign military sales (FMS), commercial exports or

direct commercial sales (DCS), drawdowns, and leasing are also addressed in security assistance legislation, not from a funding standpoint, since U.S. appropriated dollars are not involved, but from a reporting, control, and oversight perspective.¹⁸

Various laws cover the sale or grant of military materials and set the conditions by which the U.S. Government provides them. The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), part of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA); Public Law 87-195 as amended, governs the export of defense articles and defense services to foreign countries and international organizations, and includes both commercial and government programs. The AECA also requires the President to provide Congress assurances that the proposed recipient foreign country or international organization has agreed to certain security conditions regarding the protection of the articles or information.¹⁹ Responsibilities for End Use Monitoring (EUM) by the JFC include assignment of EUM as a primary responsibility to Security Assistance Offices (SAO), assessment of the effectiveness of EUM compliance, capturing the EUM level of effort for budget planning, and providing adequate funding for EUM.

The likelihood that the deployed JFC will have multifunctional logisticians that have in depth experience in security cooperation operations is low. The joint force can mitigate this risk through the development of deployable logistics capabilities not sustained by individual augmentation personnel to support security cooperation operations. This would provide the JFC with a valuable resource to ensure legal execution of logistics operations.

Joint Force Generation and Management

Improvements in force generation and management are required to provide essential logistics capabilities to the JFC in order to execute contingency security cooperation activities similar to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan CSTC-A received joint personnel resources based upon authorizations on the Joint Manning Document (JMD), requests for forces (RFF) approved by the Joint Staff and DoD and from contract civilian personnel.²⁰ Joint personnel deployments supporting the command range from three months to one year. The majority of personnel were individual augmentation from active, reserve component, and National Guard organizations.²¹ In June 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) clearly identified the negative impact that insufficient staffing and frequent rotations had on logistics support to security cooperation operations in Afghanistan.²² Civilian contractor tours varied; however, many of the logistics personnel supporting the command had over a year in theater. Internal reorganizations resulted in the command requesting additional personnel authorizations through CENTCOM to the Joint Staff and increasing the manning requirements from the two major contract personnel providers DynCorp and Military Professionals Retired Inc. (MPRI). The process to acquire additional personnel was slow and cumbersome and normally required twelve to eighteen months from the development of the requirement to the actual sourcing of the personnel on the ground. This reality of joint force manning resulted in continuous redistribution of existing joint and service provided personnel resources in order to provide capabilities to execute emerging missions and requirements.

CSTC-A's organization in 2006 contained a Police Reform Directorate (PRD) to oversee ANP development and a Defense Reform Directorate (DRD) to oversee ANA

development. Each directorate had its own logistics/resources directorate that managed the equipment and sustainment portions of the security cooperation program. Each directorate had its own training directorate to manage the training portion of the security cooperation program. The CSTC-A CJ4 oversaw internal logistics operations in the command and managed the intertheater transportation. The CJ7 (Engineers) managed the infrastructure program. The Command Surgeon's office had oversight of medical programs. The CSTC-A CJ8 managed the overall budget for the security cooperation program and the command. The Security Assistance Office (SAO) was task organized under the CJ8 and supported the entire command with management oversight of the security cooperation program.

In October 2006 a CSTC-A PRD Resources proposal recommended a significant increase in staffing in the PRD-R division. At that time, the JMD authorized nine joint personnel, and the commander had approved the addition of five personnel in an internal reorganization. In order to develop a comprehensive manning plan for PRD-R, the mission of the organization required clarification in accordance with ongoing CSTC-A logistics staff restructure plan. The responsibilities of PRD-R included providing:

- General Staff managerial oversight of the ANP equipment program
- Wholesale acquisition and procurement of ANP equipment and supplies
- Material management; receipt, storage, and issue of ANP equipment and supplies
- Property accountability to support end user monitoring of ANP equipment
- Operational and tactical logistics sustainment to Mol and ANP regional commands

- Mentorship to key Mol staff and Regional Commands
- Stewardship of the logistics management and procurement systems

The CSTC-A Commander approved an overall increase in personnel for the division to sixty-nine military personnel and seven civilian mentors.

In April 2007 the CSTC-A Commander decided to combine all directorate logistics operations under one staff lead. The CJ4 assumed the responsibility of management of all internal and external logistics programs. CJ8 transferred the SAO to CJ4 to strengthen the CJ4's ability to execute security cooperation operations. The new CJ4 task organized the DRD logistics elements along similar organizational lines as PRD-R organization. Engineering and medical functions remained within their existing organizations. This reorganization streamlined the management of the equipment and sustainment programs that were heavily dependent on synchronization of core joint logistics capabilities.

The reorganized CSTC-A CJ4 contained four subordinate offices and the CJ4 Front Office. The CJ4 Security Cooperation Programs office, which included the SAO, planned, coordinated and executed the procurement of authorized resources for the ANSF through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and local contract purchase. It maintained the Fielding Program for the ANSF and managed the international donations program. The CJ4 Logistics Support Operations Office planned, coordinated, and executed supply and maintenance operations for the ANSF and CSTC-A. It maintained the daily logistics operations synchronization matrix, managed depot operations, and oversaw contract maintenance operations. The CJ4 Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) planned and coordinated surface and air deployment and

distribution for the ANSF and CSTC-A. It maintained the daily movements plan and oversaw the integration of security with convoy movements. The CJ4 Property Book Office (PBO) developed and maintained equipment property books for the ANSF and CSTC-A. The CJ4 Front Office consisted of the CJ4, Sergeant Major, Deputy CJ4 for ANP Support, Deputy CJ4 for ANA Support, civilian mentors, and administrative personnel.²³ The functions of each office were synchronized to develop an overall CJ4 estimate of logistics operations to provide information to other staff directorates in CSTC-A.

The merger of logistics operations in support of the command and security cooperation logistics operations in support of the ANSF under the supervision of the CJ4 streamlined joint logistics operations and reduced redundancy of logistics responsibility in CSTC-A. This organizational arrangement in a deployed contingency environment assigns a huge responsibility to the CJ4; however, the capabilities-based assignment of trained logistics personnel and teams provided ample logistics horsepower to execute the joint core logistics capabilities and accomplish the JFC's objectives.

Core Joint Logistics Capabilities

The core joint logistics capabilities form the framework for successful logistics operations in support of security cooperation programs. The core joint logistics capabilities help the logistics planner to identify the key mission areas that require logistics personnel resources and processes in support of security cooperation operations. This paper will focus on supply operations and will provide

recommendations based upon lessons learned in Afghanistan on development of a joint logistics organization to execute a deployed security cooperation operation.²⁴

Supply Operations

An effective and efficient supply operation is the most critical logistics capability that joint logisticians bring to security cooperation operations. Supply operations functional capabilities include management of supply operations, inventory management, and the management of DOD's supplier networks.²⁵ The joint logistician is required to integrate the functional capabilities on a global basis in support of security cooperation operations. Supply operations in support of security cooperation programs in Afghanistan provided many challenges for the command's logisticians. The ANSF required everything from basic clothing items to complex mobile command, control and communications equipment. Inventory management included the operation of national depots, forward supply points, and the establishment of unit property accountability. Multiple global and local suppliers provided the command with ANSF resources. The command's logisticians developed methods to execute the supply operations functional capabilities through the realignment of personnel resources, standardization of processes, and on the job training.

Management of Supply Operations

The material readiness goals for the ANSF set by the CSTC-A Commander drove the management of supply operations in Afghanistan. Meeting the commander's goals required the joint logistician to integrate the budget, the efforts of supporting defense agencies, and the distribution of on-hand ANSF resources. ANSF equipment on-hand status was one of three major reportable areas common to all units in the ANSF and

reported to the Secretary of Defense on a bi-weekly basis. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified the criticality of this function in its June 2005 report, when reporting that efforts to train the ANSF far out paced the efforts to provide equipment.²⁶ The report noted that security assistance procedures complicated supply management to meet requirements.²⁷ The following year an interagency review of the program by the Department of State and Department of Defense Inspector Generals highlighted the complexity of the equipment fielding challenge.²⁸ These reports and practical experience reinforce the need for trained joint logistics managers to oversee security cooperation operations.

Inventory Management Operations

Inventory management operations are essential to maintain accountability of equipment and supplies in motion. They are equally important at the supply activity level and the unit level in the supply chain. Inventory management as noted in GAO reports from Iraq routinely cites this as a failing of U.S. forces conducting security assistance operations. Between 2004 and 2007, the GAO determined that DOD could not insure that the U.S.-funded equipment was reaching Iraqi Security Forces.²⁹ In 2006, a U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General interagency report highlighted similar accountability issues in Afghanistan. Their investigation conducted early in 2006 led to a recommendation that CSTC-A develop and implement a method of property accountability for the ANSF.³⁰ These reports and recent experience demonstrate the need for trained logistics personnel (military and civilian) to execute inventory management in support of security cooperation operations.

The rapid pace of logistics operations in Afghanistan resulted in large amounts of inventory in motion, on-hand in depots, on-hand in forward supply locations, and on-hand in ANSF organizations. The lack of a common operating system and an automated integrating inventory system complicated the challenge of maintaining visibility of inventory in motion and on-hand. Tracking items due-in to the country was labor intensive and required the daily cross-referencing of multiple sources. Stock record accountability at the depot and forward supply level relied on manual procedures using U.S. Army or Afghan forms supplemented with Microsoft Windows TM software applications.³¹ Standardized property accountability at the ANSF unit level was a new concept to the Afghans that required the development of a national-, regional-, and unit-level program to maintain basic standards.³² The program was dependent on manual procedures due to the lack of a standard automation system. Successful inventory management throughout the supply chain and detailed documentation of the final issue to ANSF units were essential to maintaining the ability to conduct regulatory End User Monitoring of defense articles provided to a foreign nation.

Management of DOD Supplier Networks

Logistics operations in Afghanistan required management of DOD supplier networks on a global scale. The ANSF requirements for vehicles, weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, uniforms, and unit mission essential equipment required global sourcing through defense agencies, contractors and international donors. For example, DOD contractors assembled Ford Ranger Light Tactical Trucks in Thailand and provided nonstandard weapons and ammunition from several countries in Eastern Europe. The CJ4 acquired the majority of the equipment

through FMS Cases under applicable security cooperation rules and regulations. The security cooperation team synchronized supplemental funding availability, production timelines, movement systems and ANSF unit readiness in order to program the procurement, distribution, and issue of required items. The complexity of global management requires a trained logistics team to integrate the core joint logistics functions to accomplish the commander's objectives.

Supply Operations Functional Capability Solutions

The establishment of one focal point in the organization to manage supply operations in support of a security cooperation program is essential within the deployed organization. In Afghanistan, the CJ4 Security Cooperation Programs Office, including the SAO, became the main effort to coordinate supply operations. The Logistics Support Operations Office, Property Book Office, and Joint Deployment and Distribution office supported the Security Cooperation Programs Office in the execution of the mission. This synchronized the supply operations functional capabilities in order to meet the commander's logistics objectives. Duties in this office directly supported security cooperation programs and the assignment of human resources was subject to regulation in accordance with Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).³³ Trained, experienced field grade officer oversight was essential to ensure success of the security cooperation program. DoDD 2055.3, Manning of Security Assistance Organizations and the Selection and USDP Training of Security Assistance Personnel provides guidance for personnel selection.³⁴ The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) provides institutional training for DOD personnel executing security cooperation duties. The Security Assistance Management Oversea

Course is required for all personnel serving in SAO positions and an executive course is available for senior leaders. The means to provide this logistics capability is available in the joint force, and it is essential that the JFC request trained logistics personnel in sufficient strength to manage the workload of the security cooperation operation.

The long-term nature of a security cooperation program and the seniority of the supported nations key personnel involved in the program necessitate the establishment of a corresponding long-term human relationship between key individuals in the organizations. Building and maintaining strong personal relationships with the current tour lengths is essentially impossible. The JFC should leverage the experience and capabilities of supporting defense agencies like the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC). This is extremely important in countries like Afghanistan where a prior COCOM security cooperation relationship did not exist. The establishment of CONUS program offices to provide continuity to long-term deployed operations is a possible solution to plug a capability gap and provide long-term supervision to a large program.

The Logistics Operations Office Supply Division oversaw inventory management operations through the establishment of stock record accounts. Supply operations depots were essential to receive, store, and issue equipment items. In Afghanistan, centralized depots were required in Kabul and forward supply points were necessary in remote regions. Supply personnel conducted tactical supply operations and provided training to ANSF personnel. The means to provide the joint capability to manage and execute supply operations exists in the joint force; however, the deployment of individual augmentation personnel continues to hinder the JFC's ability to conduct

supply operations and training. Modular supply management teams and supply support activity teams would provide the JFC with a trained team of logisticians for a designated period. Military or civilian personnel can support this function with adequate predeployment training. The benefit of deploying teams, especially to a tactical environment is a tried and true military technique as frequently demonstrated throughout history.

The JFC requires trained, experienced personnel to execute property accountability operations and to conduct training. The establishment of a Property Book Office (PBO) for ANSF equipment was essential to manage property accountability and provide training to the Afghans. The diligent oversight of property accountability was necessary for the command to fulfill legal responsibilities inherent in security cooperation operations. The means to provide this joint capability exists in the joint force and is somewhat less dependent on team deployment but highly dependent on training and experience of deployed personnel. Civilian contractors can provide additional personnel resources to support property accountability operations. The joint manning document and civilian personnel request must reflect the appropriate skill requirements to prevent the deployment of personnel without property book experience.

The lack of standard automation tools to manage supply operations, conduct inventory operations, and to interface with the DOD logistics network forced the command to adapt a manual system of supply operations supported by commercial software. Logistics experience from Iraq and Afghanistan is essential to develop automation systems to manage supply operations in support of security cooperation programs. The development should facilitate the eventual handoff of management to

the host nation while allowing the future interface into the DOD logistics network. This process will take time, especially in countries like Afghanistan, where automation skills are new to most of the population; however, it will greatly improve efficiency over time.

Supply chain planning was essential in order to synchronize supply operations. The Commander's strategic priorities provided the vision of which ANSF units would receive equipment and when. The CJ4 Security Cooperation Programs Office, Logistics Support Operations Office, Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC), and Property Book Office (PBO) coordinated daily to synchronize operations. A detailed Fielding Program, the Logistics Operations Plan, the Movement Plan, Stock Record Accounts and Unit Property Books provided the products to synchronize planning.

Conclusion

The execution of security cooperation operations in a contingency environment in support of the National Security Strategy requires the joint logistics community to provide the JFC with trained and ready forces. The human resources means exist now in the joint force to accomplish many of the core joint logistics capabilities required by the JFC to execute security cooperation programs like Afghanistan. Unique security cooperation training is only required for a select group of personnel. Each service possesses unique logistics capabilities to support SSTR operations. The provision of trained and ready logistics forces will assist the JFC to accomplish his responsibilities to execute the nation's objectives abroad in a safe, professional, and efficient manner.

Supply operations are the center of gravity for security cooperation programs in SSTR operations. Individual augmentation in support of joint manning documents fails

to produce the appropriate organizational synergy to conduct supply operations in a combat environment. The management of supply operations, inventory, and DOD supplier networks are critical functions that require trained logistics forces and supporting automated systems. Storage depot operations, supply point operations, stock record accountability and property accountability are key logistics components of security cooperation programs. The joint logistics personnel require the technical knowledge to effectively execute supply operations while training host nation personnel to eventually take over the in country duties. In addition, they require the ability and equipment to function as a deployed tactical team in a combat environment. Weakness in the supply operations center of gravity prevents synchronization of the other core joint logistics functions and has the potential to derail the entire training and equipment program for the supported nation.

Security cooperation operations have their foundations in policy, doctrine and law. Human relationships and experience are critical in maintaining long-term success in the security cooperation programs that support the National Security Strategy. The JFC must leverage the resources available in supporting Defense and Service Agencies with deployed logistics capabilities in order to capitalize on essential long-term human relationships and professional experience in the security cooperation field coupled with joint logisticians on the ground. Sufficient guidance in policy, doctrine, and law is available to develop and deploy logistics capabilities to meet the JFC's objectives.

In summary the analysis of the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) security cooperation operations in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in conjunction with policy and joint doctrine leads to the

following recommendations in order to improve supply operations in support of security cooperation programs:

- Evaluate current SSTR operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to determine where trained logistics teams can replace individual augmentation positions.
- Develop alternative methods to resource joint logistics teams executing core capabilities in order to reduce the uncertainty, management, and workload of individual augmentation deployments in support of joint operations.
- Develop and train modular logistics teams with appropriate automation tools in order to execute supply operations in support of SSTR operations.
- Develop organizational and operational concepts for military-civilian teams to execute core logistics capabilities in support of SSTR operations in conjunction with Joint Forces Command exercise programs.

The success of our logistics efforts in support of security cooperation programs in SSTR operations depends on the joint communities planning and the willingness to deploy trained personnel and teams to provide the JFC with the forces required for conducting logistics operations on the edge. The joint logistics community can meet the challenge with effective use of existing capabilities and development of automated systems to increase the efficiency of supply operations. In the balance rests billions of taxpayer dollars and our National Security Strategy objective to protect the homeland by establishing security and democracy in undeveloped nations abroad.

Endnotes

¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Logistics Support, Revision Final Coordination*, Joint Publication 4-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 25 January 2008), II-1.

² The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), *The Management of Security Assistance: Twenty-seventh Edition*, (Wright-Patterson AFB, The Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, October 2007), 1-1 – 1-7. The DISAM Green Book defines security cooperation as all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. It further identifies the twelve major security assistance programs that fall under the broader security cooperation umbrella. They are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS); Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP); Leases; Military Assistance Program (MAP); International Military Education and Training (IMET); Drawdowns, Economic Support Fund (ESF); Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). Two other related programs not included in the above 12 are Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and Third-Country Transfers.

³ Stephen A. Shambach, ed., *Strategic Leadership Primer 2nd Edition* (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, 2004), Introduction, 1-2.

⁴ Stephen E. Walker, “CJ4 Logistics Estimate,” briefing slides, Kabul, Afghanistan, CSTC-A, June 2007. The United States Government through the Department of Defense provided title 10/22 funding to the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan. Funding cycles included the FY05, FY06, FY07B, and FY07 Supplemental appropriations approved by Congress in order to fund Training, Equipment, Sustainment and Infrastructure for the ANSF. The FY05 Supplemental provided funding for 2nd and 3rd Quarter FY06. The supplemental contained \$200 million for the ANP and \$1.085 billion for the ANA. The FY06 Supplemental provided funding for 4th Quarter FY06 and 1st Quarter FY07. The supplemental contained \$1.159 billion for the ANP and \$735 million for the ANA. The FY07 Bridge Supplemental provided funding for 2nd and 3rd Quarter FY07. The supplemental contained \$491 million for the ANP and \$1 billion for the ANA. The FY07 Supplemental provided funding for 4th Quarter FY07 and 1st Quarter FY08. The supplemental contained \$2.033 billion for the ANP and \$3.866 billion for the ANA.

⁵ Ali A. Jalali, “Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum,” *Parameters* 37, (Winter 2007-2008), 8. Ali Ahmad Jalali who was the Interior Minister for Afghanistan from January 2003 to September 2005 states that the issue of legitimacy has figured in the country’s development during the past three turbulent decades. Since 1978, the unsuccessful struggle by successive governments to establish legitimacy became a major factor in destabilizing the state. The bloody Communist coup in 1978 sparked a crisis that haunted the country’s political infrastructure for decades. None of the ruling powers that succeeded the old regime managed to gain long-term legitimacy. All, including the Communists (1978-92), Mujahedin (1992-96), and Taliban (1996-2001) based their political authority on ideology enforced by military power – a process alien to mainstream Afghan values. The regimes’ efforts were challenged by religious and cultural resistance and hampered by factional divides, structural deficiency, economic failure, and foreign interference.

⁶ Stephen Howard Chadwick, *Defense Acquisition: Overview, Issues, and Options for Congress* (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20 June 2007), 1-16.

⁷ George W. Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 16 March 2006), 1.

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004), 12-13.

⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Directive No. 3000.05 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 28 November 2005), 1-11.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, December 2006), i-ii.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, vii.

¹² *Ibid.*, ix.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Planning*, Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 26 December 2006), I-1 - I-3.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 17 September 2006), V-23 - V-24.

¹⁵ U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 February 2008), 3-12 – 3-16.

¹⁶ Joint Publication 4-0, I-9.

¹⁷ DISAM, 1-7.

¹⁸ DISAM, 2-1.

¹⁹ *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*, U.S. Code, title 22, Section 2785.

²⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *Personnel Support to Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 1-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 16 October 2006), IV-2 – IV-3.

²¹ Joint Publication 1-0, F-1 – F-5.

²² U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined* GAO 05-575 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 30 June 2005), 15.

²³ Walker.

²⁴ Maintenance, contract management, logistics services, distribution and deployment were CJ4 functions. A discussion of each would drastically increase the scope of this paper. The CSTC-A engineer office managed operational engineering. The CSTC-A Command Surgeons office managed Health Services.

²⁵ Joint Publication 4-0, I-9.

²⁶ GAO 05-575, 11.

²⁷ GAO 05-575, 14.

²⁸ U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, *Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, November 2006), 42-49.

²⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilizing Iraq, DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces*, GAO 07-711 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 31 July 2007), Highlights.

³⁰ U.S. Department of State, 49.

³¹ U.S. Department of the Army, *Policies and Procedures for Property Accountability*, Army Regulation 735-5 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 10 June 2002), 7. AR 735-5 defines stock record accountability as a formally established set of records and files used to account for U.S. Army property being held for issue.

³² Ibid. AR 735-5 defines property book accountability as a formal set of property account records and files maintained at the user level. It is used to record and account for all nonexpendable property and other specialty designated property issued to an activity.

³³ Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) contains a variety of provisions dealing with the organization and roles of SAOs. These provisions limit the number of members of the armed forces permanently assigned to a SAO for the management of United States (U.S.) assistance and sales programs to six, unless specifically authorized by the Congress. This provision does not apply to civilian billets or to combatant command (COCOM) non-security assistance (SA) military billets within the SAO. This limitation for SA related staffing may be waived if the president determines that U.S. national interests require more than six such personnel.

³⁴ Directive No. 3000.05, 1-11.